Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access published online on October 7, 2009
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, doi:10.1093/joclec/nhp018
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF A ROAD-SURFACING CARTEL IN SWITZERLAND
Correspondence: E-mail: hueschelrath{at}zew.de.
JEL: L41, K21
The paper assesses the impact of the detection of a hard-core cartel in the Swiss market for road surfacing on post-cartel competition. In addition to an investigation of supply-side factors, demand-side factors, and market prices, the paper also derives estimates of the economic effects of the Swiss Competition Commission's decision in the road-surfacing cartel case. The results indicate that the detection of the cartel may have led to short-term price reductions; however, the persistent collusion-friendly industry structure forecloses larger and durable gains for the customers.
* Researcher, Department for Industrial Economics and International Management, ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany; Assistant Professor for Industrial Organization and Competitive Strategy, WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management, Vallendar, Germany.
** Researcher, Department for Industrial Economics and International Management, ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany. E-mail: leheyda{at}zew.de.
*** Senior Researcher, Department for Industrial Economics and International Management, ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany. E-mail: beschorner{at}zew.de. A preliminary version of the paper is part of a study for the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, SECO. The complete study can be downloaded at http://www.weko.admin.ch/dokumentation/00216/index.html?lang=de. We would like to thank Sven Michal, Samuel Rutz, Frank Stüssi, Spyros Arvanitis, and Martin Wörter for helpful comments on drafts of the study, and Dace Lauberte and Shampa Ghosh for excellent research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.