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Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access published online on April 21, 2009
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, doi:10.1093/joclec/nhp009
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© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

REGULATION OF LIBERAL PROFESSIONS AND COMPETITION POLICY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EU AND CHINA

Niels J. Philipsen *

Correspondence: E-mail: niels.philipsen{at}facburfdr.unimaas.nl.

JEL: K21, K33, L44, L51

The regulation of professional services has been high on the political agenda for years now in Europe. This paper points out the methods of working and the strategies used by the European Commission (Directorate General for Competition) and various national competition authorities to promote deregulation of the professions throughout the European Union. Central to this discussion are the so-called public interest and private interest approaches to regulation. On the one hand, the European Commission seems to have been influenced by developments in particular Member States (bottom-up effects), whereas on the other hand, there have been top-down effects in recent years, at least in some Member States. The European experience is used to study the recent developments in China, and in particular the regulation of lawyers. I find that the argument of information asymmetry may have more relevance in China than in Europe. In addition, the fact that liability rules may not yet be a good alternative for (or supplement to) quality regulation may also make a stronger case for regulation in China. However, economic theory and European practice have taught us that there is a general risk of disproportional regulation.

* METRO Institute for Transnational Legal Research, PO Box 616, Maastricht University, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands. I am grateful to Lili Wang for tracing and translating some of the Chinese regulations presented in this paper, and to Michael Faure for commenting on an early draft. Disclaimer: Although in 2003 I was a member of the ‘liberal professions team’ of the European Commission (DG Competition), the views expressed in this paper are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of DG Competition. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Peking University in May 2007 and at Shandong University in November 2007.


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