Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access published online on April 3, 2009
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, doi:10.1093/joclec/nhp008
DETECTION OF ANTICOMPETITIVE HORIZONTAL MERGERS
Correspondence: E-mail: hueschelrath{at}zew.de
JEL: L40, L41, K21
This paper discusses possibilities to detect anticompetitive horizontal mergers. In particular, it develops a detection framework for antitrust authorities. The framework considers the potential welfare effects of mergers through changes in product prices and efficiencies, as well as product variety, marketing, and innovation incentives. The implementation of the framework is addressed through the derivation of back-of-the-envelope formulas.
* Researcher, Department for Industrial Economics and International Management, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), L 7, 1, 68161 Mannheim, Germany. A preliminary version of the paper was presented at the 2008 Annual Conference of the Eastern Economic Association in Boston, the 2008 Annual Conference of the Midwest Economic Association in Chicago, and the 2008 Annual Congress of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Graz. I would like to thank session participants for their valuable comments. Furthermore I am indebted to the editor J. Gregory Sidak for very helpful remarks and suggestions which significantly improved the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.