Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access originally published online on February 18, 2009
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2009 5(3):571-579; doi:10.1093/joclec/nhp004
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MARKET POWER IN COMPETITION FOR THE MARKET
Correspondence: E-mail: sanpark{at}snu.ac.kr
JEL: K21, L40, L10
In the evaluation of abuse of dominance (or Section 2 cases in the United States), the standard method of proving monopoly power is typically faced with difficulties in measuring the competitive price level and the substantiality of market power. These difficulties are more obvious in industries characterized by R&D competition for the market, where drastic innovation, standardization, or bidding for the entire demand is central figure. On the basis of a simple model of R&D competition for the market, this paper provides the competitive price level and the threshold level of substantiality of market power, showing that the absence of barriers to R&D competition ensures no abuse of dominance in these industries.
* Associate Professor, Seoul National University, South Korea.