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Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access originally published online on October 14, 2008
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2009 5(2):269-295; doi:10.1093/joclec/nhn030
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© The Author (2008). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

OPTIMAL LEGAL STANDARDS FOR REFUSALS TO LICENSE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A WELFARE-BASED ANALYSIS

Yannis S. Katsoulacos *

Correspondence: E-mail: ysk{at}hol.gr

JEL: K0, K2, K4, L4, L5

This article adopts a welfare-based, in contrast to a decision-theoretic (DT), approach to the choice of legal standards for refusals to license intellectual property. It is shown that if the presumption of legality is not strong, as was the European Commission's point of view in the Microsoft interoperability information case, DT considerations are not helpful for deciding which type of standard is superior. Indeed, a "low false-acquittals" rule, such as the Microsoft rule, may be equally effective as a "low false-convictions" rule, such as the "exceptional circumstances" rule, in reducing the costs of decision errors. However, it is also shown that the latter rule may well be welfare superior to the former rule because of its welfare-improving deterrence effects. Further, it is shown that when the presumption of legality is strong, both of these rules are likely to be welfare-inferior to per se legality (the standard chosen in Xerox), even though the "exceptional circumstances" test may be superior in decision error terms.


* Professor of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business. Thanks are due to the seminar participants at the University College London Law Department for their helpful comments. I am particularly grateful to Professor Korah and Ioannis Lianos for making helpful suggestions on an earlier version of the manuscript. All errors, ambiguities, and inaccuracies are entirely my responsibility.


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