Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access originally published online on November 8, 2008
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2009 5(2):233-247; doi:10.1093/joclec/nhn032
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THE ROLE OF FIXED COST SAVINGS IN MERGER ANALYSIS
Correspondence: E-mail: robert.rubinovitz{at}nera.com
JEL: L40
Among the many motivations for mergers, clearly one of the more important considerations is the extent to which the merger will generate cost savings for the firms involved. Standard economic models demonstrate that a decrease in marginal cost leads to a lower price, whereas a decrease in fixed costs does not necessarily have this effect. Thus, from the Antitrust Agencies' perspective, in a merger analysis, emphasis should be placed on marginal cost savings because these efficiencies will create short-run benefits for consumers, in terms of lower price and higher output, and should be given the most weight. Of late, increasing attention has been given to how fixed cost savings can improve consumer welfare. One key insight is that demonstrating the direct effects of fixed cost savings on consumer welfare may require a longer time horizon than marginal cost savings or may require embedding these savings in a dynamic context. This paper exhibits an approach that provides straightforward predictions on the relationship between fixed costs, prices, and consumer welfare. When the fixed cost of producing quality decreases, it is shown that consumer welfare increases. The clear implication of this model is that fixed cost savings should be given weight in the analysis of the potential effects of a merger on consumer welfare.
* Vice President, NERA Economic Consulting.