Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access originally published online on August 13, 2008
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2008 4(3):775-790; doi:10.1093/joclec/nhn023
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CHANGING THE PRESUMPTION OF WHEN TO REGULATE: THE RATIONALE OF CANADIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM

Correspondence: E-mail: d.krause{at}bell.ca
JEL: K23, L50, L96, L98
In a dynamic environment such as the telecommunications industry, it becomes increasingly difficult to consistently determine and enforce optimal regulatory responses. To improve the rigor and responsiveness of the regulator, the regulatory process should contain four elements: (i) the regulator should have a clear policy framework with an emphasis on reliance upon market forces to the maximum extent feasible; (ii) the regulator should be subject to a standards-based, legally binding test; (iii) there should be an advocate for market forces; and (iv) there should be regular and frequent external reviews. Recent changes to the regulatory process for the Canadian telecommunications industry have incorporated all four of these elements. These changes should limit the regulatory process' ability to impede the benefits that Canadians receive from continuing technological innovation and increasing competitiveness of the telecommunications industry.
* Counsel, Stikeman Elliot LLP. E-mail: lhunter{at}stikeman.com.
** Regulatory Affairs, Bell Canada. E-mail: philippe.gauvin{at}bell.ca.
Economic Analysis, Bell Canada. Corresponding author. This paper is based on a speech given by Lawson Hunter at the Global Communications Consortium Autumn Conference, November 2007. The authors would like to thank Jonathan Blakey, Pierre-Luc Hébert, Gregory Sidak, and participants at the Global Communications Consortium Autumn Conference, for helpful comments.