Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access originally published online on August 28, 2008
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2008 4(3):753-773; doi:10.1093/joclec/nhn024
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SOME DYNAMICS OF HIGH-TECH MERGER ANALYSIS IN GENERAL AND WITH RESPECT TO XM–SIRIUS
Correspondence: E-mail: thazlett{at}gmu.edu
JEL: K21, L41, L82
Horizontal merger evaluation is heavily reliant on market definition. An SSNIP framework formats the analysis, and demand elasticity evidence used to apply the test is often sparse, as is often found in high-technology industries. This paper examines other sources of evidence that reveal the dynamics of market structure, data that are also probative in the evaluation of competitive effects. These sources include capital valuations of firms, financial event studies, and the public positions taken with respect to the merger by interested parties. Such evidence is examined in the XM–Sirius merger (2007–08) and shown—in two of the three instances—to be relatively informative in merger welfare analysis.
* Professor of Law and Economics, George Mason University, Arlington, VA, United States. This paper is based on a presentation at the Conference on High Tech Mergers, sponsored by the Information Economy Project at GMU (1 February 2008) and ably organized by Joshua Wright. Comments received from conference participants were very helpful to the analysis herein. The analysis benefits also from research conducted for the two White Papers on the XM–Sirius merger the author wrote while retained as an expert for the merging parties. Hazlett wishes to thank George Bittlingmayer, Steve Brenner, Arthur Havenner, and Steve Salop for valuable input, with the usual disclaimer. He is also indebted to his sparring partner in this regulatory matter, J. Gregory Sidak.