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Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access originally published online on October 22, 2007
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2008 4(1):31-59; doi:10.1093/joclec/nhm022
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© The Author (2007). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

FORENSIC ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON PRICE FIXING

John M. Connor *

This paper aims at explaining accepted methods of forensic analysis and how forensic economics is used in the context of competition-law enforcement. Illustrations are drawn from ancient and modern antitrust cases involving price-fixing allegations. The stated goal of antitrust laws of most nations is deterrence. Optimal deterrence requires that cartel penalties be based on multiples of economic injuries. Yet, antitrust authorities are typically reluctant to calculate fines on the basis of damages because of perceived analytical challenges or because the fact-finders lack needed economic education. However, reasonable estimates of damages can often be quickly prepared using simpler methods than econometric modeling. More often than not, alternative estimates of cartel overcharges tend to be mutually supportive. The reluctance of antitrust authorities to base fines on damages seems to indicate an abundance of caution.

* Professor of Industrial Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA. E-mail: jconnor{at}purdue.edu. Prepared for delivery at a workshop sponsored by the Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics, "Forensic Economics in Competition Law Enforcement," Amsterdam, March 17, 2006. ARP No. 2006-17888.


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