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Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access originally published online on October 22, 2007
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2008 4(1):115-128; doi:10.1093/joclec/nhm021
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© The Author (2007). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

ON THE ALLEGEDLY INVISIBLE DUTCH CONSTRUCTION SECTOR CARTEL

Peter A.G. van Bergeijk *

This paper considers an extensive cartel contamination of markets in the Dutch construction sector. Overwhelming legal evidence of bid rigging in this sector was obtained in 486 leniency applications in which complete secret accounts were submitted. I offer a case study and a broadly based post mortem of methodologies that were applied earlier to detect malfunctioning markets in the Netherlands, but failed to identify the construction sector as problematic. It is concluded that these studies were seriously flawed. Theoretical and empirical economic forensics (if properly applied) creates value for antitrust authorities in detection of antitrust violations directly, or by informing them where to look for direct evidence.

* Economic Policy Directorate Ministry of Economic Affairs, P.O. Box 20101, 2500 EC, The Hague, The Netherlands. E-mail: p.a.g.vanbergeijk@minez.nl. This article was written when the author was Economic Counsel at the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa). It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Dutch Government and builds on earlier research with Peter Meulmeester, Simon Bremer, and Rob van der Laan. Comments by Joris Pinkse, Maarten Pieter Schinkel, and three anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.


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