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Journal of Competition Law and Economics Advance Access originally published online on November 28, 2007
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2008 4(1):1-30; doi:10.1093/joclec/nhm033
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© The Author (2007). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

FORENSIC ECONOMICS IN COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT

Maarten Pieter Schinkel *

This paper delineates the specialty field of forensic industrial organization (IO) as the application of theoretical and empirical industrial organization economics in the legal process of competition law enforcement. Four stages of that process that can benefit from forensic IO techniques are distinguished: detection and investigation; case development; decision-making and litigation; and remedies, sanctions, and damages. We survey the use of economics in such aspects as identifying potential forms of anticompetitive behavior, screening markets for competition law violations, determining causality, advising on appropriate remedies, and assessing antitrust damages. The paper discusses the role of expert economic witnesses in competition cases. It calls for an organization of forensic IO within the context of existing forensic institutes.

* Department of Economics and ACLE, Universiteit van Amsterdam and CEPR. Roetersstraat 11, 1018WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: m.p.schinkel@uva.nl. The papers in this special issue were selected from contributions to the ACLE workshop Forensic Economics in Competition Law Enforcement, held March 17, 2006 at the Universiteit van Amsterdam. John Connor, Andrew I. Gavil, and Franklin M. Fisher made outstanding keynote contributions to the event. I am indebted to them, as well as to other participants at the workshop, for stimulating discussions. I thank the editors of the Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Damien Geradin and Gregory Sidak, and more than twenty anonymous referees for their assistance in the editorial process. Iwan Bos, John Connor, Kati Cseres, Franklin M. Fisher, Andy Gavil, Vivek Ghosal, Martijn Han, Jon McNally, Jakob Rüggeberg, Francesco Russo, Daniel Slottje, Jan Tuinstra and Gregory Werden gave constructive comments to an earlier version of this paper. Norman Bremer and Marie Goppelsroeder provided excellent research assistance. Opinions and errors remain mine.


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