A CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR CHURCH'S REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF VERTICAL AND CONGLOMERATE MERGERS ON COMPETITION
We discuss Professor Jeffrey Church's report to the European Commission in 2004 on the effects of vertical restraints and mergers. Although thorough and accurate, the report could be misinterpreted by practitioners, as it does not emphasize that market power is only a necessary condition for harm to competition, and that most vertical mergers that present the possibility of competitive harm also present economic efficiencies that are intrinsic to the integration.
* Assistant Director, Office of Policy Planning, U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Email: jcooper1{at}ftc.gov. The views expressed herein are the authors' alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual commissioner.
** William Oehmig Associate Professor of Management, Vanderbilt University. Email: Luke.Froeb{at}owen.vanderbilt.edu.
*** Chief, Regulatory Section, Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice. Email: dan.obrien{at}usdoj.gov. The views expressed herein are his own and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Justice or the U.S. Government.
**** Associate Director, Bureau of Economics, U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Email: MVITA{at}ftc.gov.